Class 12. Hybrid Warfare: What Is It?
The reason we call it "information warfare" is because our adversaries view propaganda and disinformation as a way to wage war using both military and nonmilitary means.
I recently attended a virtual conference hosted by the U.S. Naval War College and was particularly interested in two sessions: One about “the gray zone,” which was defined as “below the threshold of armed conflict,” and the other which was about “hybrid warfare,” which was defined as “irregular warfare within, integral to, or complementing” international armed conflict. This seemed like a strange division to me, as I had normally encountered “hybrid warfare” as synonymous with “gray zone” and thought that there might be some agreed-upon definitions I might have missed. Turns out, I hadn’t. The speakers all had different and interchangeable definitions of gray zone and hybrid warfare (also used interchangeably with “irregular” and “asymmetrical” warfare), though they did seem to agree that all involve activities that were short of conventional war.
This bright line distinction — the threshold between conventional, armed conflict, and everything that comes before it — is, at least, a helpful starting point. It was the same distinction that our speaker from last week, Seth Jones, (who uses the term “irregular warfare”) made in our discussion as well as in his writings:
In particular, irregular warfare is distinct from conventional warfare, which has sometimes been referred to as “traditional” or “regular” warfare. Conventional warfare involves the use of direct land, naval, air, and other military capabilities to defeat an adversary’s armed forces on a battlefield; control territory, populations, and forces; or annihilate an enemy’s war-making capacity. Irregular warfare is also different from nuclear warfare, which involves the use—or threat—of nuclear weapons against adversaries. Finally, irregular warfare is distinct from routine foreign policy, which can include diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, and other activities that have little or nothing to do with competition against adversaries.
Seth spent some time in our discussion explaining how Russia, in particular, understands irregular warfare. The articulation of Russia’s understanding comes from an essay written by its Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, pictured here:
He looks like a lot of fun at parties, doesn’t he? (For real, Google this guy, I don’t think there is a single picture of him smiling.) Back in 2013, Gerasimov wrote an essay called “The Value of Science is in the Foresight” (the original obviously in Russian and published in the Military Industrial Courier) which outlined how war is conducted in the 21st century. Dubbed the “Gerasimov Doctrine,” the general wasn’t so much as articulating a new military strategy for Russia, but rather analyzing how he believed the U.S. was already waging war, and what Russia needed to do to catch up. Drawing on his observations of the 1991 U.S. invasion of Iraq and going up to the Arab Spring (in which he believed the U.S. had a hidden hand, even though it didn’t), Gerasimov writes:
The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness….Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of an enemy’s advantages in armed conflict. Among such actions are the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are constantly being perfected.
Gerasimov then includes this incredibly helpful chart, laying out how the “new” warfare differs from conventional warfare:
So if Gerasimov was describing something the U.S. was already doing, and apparently doing quite well (to the extent that his interpretation of our actions was true — which it was with regard to things like Iraq and Afghanistan, if not Arab Spring), why does it feel like we are the ones who are wrapping our minds around it, and trying to play catch up?
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