Class 25. Election Interference 201

Our foreign election interference report card as we head into 2024. It's a mixed bag.

It’s fitting that I am closing out the third module of the course, Disinformation and Election Interference, on the eve of another election year. Over the last few months, we have taken a deep dive into the theory of election interference, conducted a detailed post-mortem of Russia’s 2016 disinformation and influence operations, and seen how racism continues to be the most easily exploitable fissure in American society. So what have we learned, and where do things stand now?

In this lesson I’ll conduct a general assessment of how the U.S. has responded over the last seven years to foreign election interference, and whether we are prepared for 2024. Bottom line up front: While we have come a long way, particularly in some of our institutional efforts, to combat election disinformation, we still have a ways to go to fully address the problem. But, don’t get discouraged! After the New Year, I will be turning our attention to what, exactly, makes America so vulnerable to disinformation, and what we can do to generate more societal, psychological, and digital resilience as we head towards November 2024.

So let’s turn to the report card:

The Good News

Perhaps the best place to look to see how far we have come when it comes to foreign election interference in presidential elections is the Intelligence Community Assessment of Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections. One key takeaway in the assessment is the IC’s distinction between election influence — the attempt of foreign actors to affect candidates or voter preferences (changing hearts and minds) — and election interference, or the attempt to target the technical aspects of election infrastructure and vote tabulation (changing votes). On the latter front, the assessment unequivocally states that the IC did not see any efforts by foreign actors, including Russia, to tamper with election infrastructure in 2020, as it did in 2016.

On the influence front, the IC appeared to be monitoring the “misleading and unsubstantiated allegations against President Biden” involving alleged corruption between him, his family, and officials in Ukraine. (Sound familiar?) What I think is notable is not only that the IC was proactively tracking this narrative, but that it was doing so under a Trump administration! Indeed, the classified version of the IC’s assessment was provided to President Biden and congressional intelligence committees on January 7, 2021 — which means that despite the tumult of the Trump years and some of the crazy officials he put in charge at, e.g., DNI, DHS, and elsewhere, our intelligence agencies were keeping their heads down and doing their jobs through the 2020 election. I don’t know about you, but I find that incredibly heartening, and it gives me hope that as the government ship has been further righted over the past four years, we are in even better shape going into next year. A few specific aspects to note on our progress:

Public Exposure of Foreign Election Influence Efforts

Back in Class 12 I discussed the concept of reflexive control, which is the art of manipulating an adversary to react in predetermined ways. The interesting thing about reflexive control is that if the target becomes aware that they are being manipulated, that awareness has to be taken into account in the next operation (thereby making the target a bit harder to manipulate). As the IC assessment notes, “[g]reater public and media awareness of influence operations in 2020 compared to past election cycles probably helped counter them to some degree.” In fact, Trump’s win in 2016 probably did more to make that awareness more pervasive than it would have been otherwise — after all, the special counsel investigation generated two “speaking” indictments (one against the GRU and the other against Putin’s troll farm), which the media covered pretty well, that helped publicly expose Russia’s M.O. In a similar vein, in 2017, the FBI created a Combating Foreign Influence Task Force with a public facing website, as well as this helpful PSA video (we can leave aside for the moment that it’s been viewed fewer than four thousand times in the past four years, which is a little sad):

The point is that there has at least been some progress made on educating the public and raising public awareness, and that awareness can be among the most effective ways to neutralize foreign influence operations.

Offensive Capabilities of the U.S. Cyber Command

Prior to the 2018 midterm elections, President Trump issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 13 (NPSM-13), which authorized the U.S. Cyber Command to engage in offensive operations in cyberspace that fell below the threshold of the “use of force” (a level that would cause death, destruction, or significant economic impact). This change allowed the military to move from a defensive, reactive posture to one that could preemptively disrupt or disable advseraries’ networks (like Russia’s troll farm) before they attacked us.

Although the specifics of NSPM-13 remain classified, it appears that under Trump, it allowed the Defense Department to engage in offensive cyber operations without getting approval from the State Department and even without the White House’s knowledge (this aspect of the policy was reversed by Biden to bring State and the White House back into the loop). This change was largely orchestrated by John Bolton when he was Trump’s national security adviser, and I have to wonder how much Trump was aware of what he was authorizing — especially since this authority is apparently what thwarted Russia’s influence efforts in the 2018 midterms. The most hilarious part of CyberCom’s efforts in 2018 was how it reportedly targeted individuals working at the troll farms, letting them know that the U.S. military had identified them and was watching them. (My favorite line from this article is this one “It is not clear if the information was delivered in an email, a chat or some other electronic intervention.”)

CyberCom built on this capability in 2020, expanding its operations to hunt down hackers in Russia, Iran, and China in advance of the presidential election that year. Go DoD!

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Another surprising move Trump made while president (again, it’s unclear whether he was really aware of what he was signing) was the creation of a new federal agency, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), in November 2018. Tasked with “protecting the Nation's critical infrastructure from physical and cyber threats,” the agency appears to be well organized and effective, despite being under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security, which is basically a hot mess and needs to be torn down and rebuilt from the bottom up.

While CISA serves a range of functions, including as a hub between the government and private sector for communicating and protecting against foreign cyber threats, the agency has been very active during U.S. elections (presidential and midterm), featuring a “rumor vs. reality” webpage highlighting and debunking election dis- and misinformation. In the lead up to the 2020 election, CISA helped identify an Iranian influence operation in which emails purporting to be from the Proud Boys were sent to Democratic voters with a threatening demand that they switch their party affiliation and vote for Trump. (The plot was foiled because of the Iranians’ sloppiness and two Iranian nationals were caught and charged for the scheme in 2021.)

Finally, you’ll remember that CISA’s first director, Chris Krebs, was fired by Trump for standing behind his agency’s assessment that the 2020 presidential election was secure…a pretty good sign that both he and CISA did their jobs well.

Managing Election Expectations

In September of 2018, I co-authored a piece for Just Security with David Shimer, author of the book Rigged: America, Russia, and 100 Years of Covert Electoral Interference. We were growing concerned with Trump’s rhetoric at the time, which was casting doubt on mail-in ballots and setting the stage for his Stop the Steal campaign (though of course we had no idea then how far that would actually go). Our piece centered around the need for media, trusted leaders, and civic organizations to manage expectations, in particular around the length of time it might take for a winner to be declared, given the unusual voting conditions amidst the pandemic.

The media did a commendable job, reiterating in the months and weeks leading up to the elections that mail-in voting remained safe and secure, and that it might take time for the votes to be counted. I was pleased to see at the time that these messages were being echoed on social media through the hashtag #TrustedInfo2020, created by the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) in November 2019 to create a hub of reliable voting information. Also in advance of the 2020 election, there was a widespread coalition between civic groups, corporations, faith-based organizations, and others to shape norms around election integrity, and in particular around ensuring voters’ faith in the process, as well as the outcome.

All of these efforts, to me, show that with proper messaging and coordination, the American electorate can be preconditioned to be resilient to election dis- and misinformation. This will be especially important in 2024, so hopefully these cross-cutting organizational efforts will be replicated, even in the absence of a crisis like the pandemic.

The Bad News

So overall, that’s not so bad, right? I mean, we haven’t been completely asleep at the wheel or anything. Still, there is a lot that remains worrisome heading into 2024. I don’t think it is panic-worthy, but it does point to a landscape where a second Trump administration could undo what little has been done to date and make sure that foreign interference (as long as it is on his behalf) is welcomed going forward.

There’s Been No Meaningful Foreign Election Interference Legislation or Regulation

Let’s start with the fact that since 2016, Congress has failed to pass major election security legislation to close social media, campaign financing, and foreign influence loopholes since the 2016 election. Take campaign ads. You know how when you watch political ads on TV, or listen to them on the radio, you hear the “paid for by…” message? That’s a legal requirement. The problem is that the Federal Election Commission’s current definition of “electioneering communications” doesn’t include internet or digital ads — which is what allowed Russia to place its dark ads on Facebook in 2016 (and, presumably, in 2018 and 2020). The Honest Ads Act, which was initially introduced in 2017, would have extended these legal requirements to internet and social media…but it never went anywhere. Recently, Senators Amy Klobuchar, Mark Warner, and Lindsay Graham (yes, Lindsay Graham) reintroduced the bill, so we’ll see what happens. I don’t have my hopes up.

Meanwhile, Republicans derailed other efforts to prevent foreign election influence. For example, the Stopping Harmful Interference in Elections for a Lasting Democracy (SHIELD) Act, which would require political campaigns to report offers of campaign assistance from foreign governments and tighten loopholes allowing foreign money to enter campaigns, was blocked by Republicans when (the first) impeachment proceedings started against Trump. Ditto for the Securing America’s Federal Elections (SAFE) Act, which would have prevented voting machines from being produced in foreign countries and provided more funding for the FEC. Trump, of course, planned to veto these anyway.

Russia Has Learned That It Doesn’t Even Have to Prefer a Particular Candidate

There’s a scene from the first Jurassic Park movie that always comes to mind when I read the latest about Russia’s election interference efforts: It’s the one where the game warden talks about how the velociraptors are smart enough to systematically test for vulnerabilities:

Well, I was reminded of this scene once again when I read this Washington Post piece about Russia’s shifting tactics in its election game. According to the article:

‘Our insights suggest that Russia is focused on carrying out operations to break public confidence in election integrity, and that they are doing this on a global scale,’ a senior U.S. intelligence official said, also speaking on the condition of anonymity. ‘Our information indicates that senior Russian government officials, including in the Kremlin, see value in this type of influence operation and perceive it to be effective in undermining confidence in the outcomes and legitimacy of the elected government.’

In other words, the Kremlin has realized that it doesn’t have to “nudge” voters in favor of one candidate or against another…it can simply erode faith in the voting process itself, and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the outcome. Hmmm….I wonder where they got that idea from?

Conservative Courts are Tying the Government’s Hands When it Comes to Coordinating with Social Media

I covered this in my class on Project Lakhta, but things are not looking great in terms of the intelligence community’s ability to flag foreign disinformation to social media companies going into the 2024 election. Pursuant to a lawsuit brought by the states of Missouri and Louisiana, three doctors, a news website, and a healthcare activist against President Biden and other government officials, the Fifth Circuit in October put in place a modified injunction prohibiting the government from “tak[ing any] actions, formal or informal, directly or indirectly, to coerce or significantly encourage social-media companies to remove, delete, suppress, or reduce, including through altering their algorithms, posted social-media content containing protected free speech.” Basically, this order would have prevented the government from communicating with social media companies about any kind of disinformation on their platforms.

The Supreme Court stayed the injunction later that month, agreeing to hear the merits of the case — not surprisingly, Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch dissented from the Court’s decision to stay the injunction. The Court will hear arguments on the case early next year and will issue its decision by the end of its term in June. If the Court decides to uphold the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, government agencies — including the FBI and CISA — will have their hands tied when it comes to working with social media companies to flag and remove dis- and misinformation, including election disinformation.

Trump “Lost” an Entire Binder of Raw Intelligence on Russia

It’s hard for me to believe that this story lasted for all of about a day in the media, but in case anyone cares, an entire binder full of unredacted, raw intelligence related to Russia’s 2016 election interference has been missing since Trump left office. What was in it? According to this CNN reporting:

The binder contained raw intelligence the US and its NATO allies collected on Russians and Russian agents, including sources and methods that informed the US government’s assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to help Trump win the 2016 election, sources tell CNN.

The intelligence was so sensitive that lawmakers and congressional aides with top secret security clearances were able to review the material only at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, where their work scrutinizing it was itself kept in a locked safe.

We can and should assume that this raw intelligence is now in Russia’s hands, which means that the sources and methods that produced it are at risk, if they have not been compromised already. In short, Russia likely has a blueprint of everything the U.S. intelligence community found the first time around, and can correct for those mistakes in 2024.

Other Foreign Actors Are Joining the Game

Just this past Monday, the National Intelligence Council released its Intelligence Community Assessment of Foreign Threats to the 2022 U.S. Elections. Although this report focused on the congressional midterm election, it offers a window into what to expect on the presidential election front in 2024. The big takeaway here is that China is getting in on the game. According to the assessment, China, like Russia, seeks to amplify divisive issues in the U.S., as PRC leaders see this “as a response to what they believe is an intensified U.S. effort to promote democracy at China’s expense,” and “as an opportunity to portray the democratic model as chaotic, ineffective, and unrepresentative.” Similarly, Iran has also gotten on board with the goal of “pitting extremist groups” against one another to weaken the U.S.’ support for Israel. Finally, Cuba is in the mix, though its focus appears to be at the congressional and gubernatorial levels, with a goal of promoting Havana’s interests rather than sowing division and chaos.

The only sort of good news coming out of the assessment is that none of these actors (including Russia) appear very interested in trying to tamper with actual voting infrastructure or tabulation…they see influence operations as being more effective, cheap, and efficient.

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So that’s where things stand heading into 2024. If I had to give it a grade, I think it would be a C+…maybe a B-. You know, better than average overall, and not a total flunk, but wow, could use some improvement.

It feels like it’s time for a drink. See you at happy hour!

Discussion questions:

1. What grade would you give the U.S. based on the “report card” above?

2. What are your biggest concerns regarding foreign election interference heading into 2024?